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Abstract
In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a
bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class
of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm consists of an initial bid sequence and an
algorithm for randomly permuting the sequence. We are especially concerned with situations
where some bidders know the bidding algorithms of others. For the case of only two bidders,
we give an optimal bidding algorithm for the disadvantaged bidder. Our result generalizes
previous work by allowing the bidders to have unequal budgets. One might naturally anticipate
that the optimal expected numbers of objects won by the bidders would be proportional to
their budgets. Surprisingly, this is not true. Our new algorithm runs in optimal O(n) time in
a straightforward manner. The case with more than two bidders is open.
1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized the usefulness of auction as a means of price determination
without intermediary market makers. As a result, there already exists an enormous Economics
literature on auction theory and practice (see, e.g., [12, 16–18, 20, 27]). Relatively recently, com-
puter scientists have become aware of the potential efficiency of auction as a general method of
resource allocation [7]. For instance, Gagliano, Fraser, and Schaefer [11] applied auction tech-
niques to allocating decentralized network resources. Bertsekas [2] designed an auction-type
algorithm for the classical maximum flow problem.
With the advent of the Word Wide Web, Internet-based auction is rapidly becoming an
essential buying and selling medium for both individuals and organizations. It is projected that
most of the future Internet auctions will necessarily be conducted by software agents instead
of human bidders and auctioneers [13, 21, 22, 28]. Consequently, there is an increasing need for
highly efficient and sophisticated auction mechanisms and bidding algorithms. To meet this need,
Computer Science is witnessing heightened research efforts on such mechanisms and algorithms.
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Among the several basic research themes that have emerged from these efforts, the following three
are particularly relevant to this paper.
The first theme is multiple-object auction [1, 8, 9, 15, 19, 23], where each bidder may bid on
several objects simultaneously instead of one at a time. The second theme is the informational
security of auction. For instance, Cachin [6] and Stajano and Anderson [26] were concerned with
the privacy of bidders. Sako [24] discussed how to hide information about losing bids. The third
theme is the computational complexity of auction [9, 10, 15, 19, 23]. For example, Sandholm and
Suri [25] and Akcoglu, Aspnes, DasGupta, and Kao [1] proposed general frameworks for tackling
the computational hardness of the winner determination problem for combinatorial auction, which
is a special form of multiple-object auction.
Along these three themes, Kao, Qi, and Tan [14] considered the position-randomized multiple-
object auction model specified as follows:
M1 There are m bidders competing for n objects, where m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1. Each bidder has a
positive budget and aims to win as many objects as possible.
M2 Each bidder submits to the auction (1) an initial sequence of n bids whose total may not
exceed the bidder’s budget and (2) a randomized algorithm for permuting the bids. Each bid
must be positive or zero. The final bid sequence that a bidder actually uses in the auction is
obtained by permuting her initial bid sequence with her bid-permuting algorithm. The i-th
bid of each final sequence is for the i-th object. If an object has m′ highest bids, then each
of these m′ bidders wins this object with probability 1
m′
.
M3 Before submitting their initial bid sequences and bid-permuting algorithms, all bidders know
n, m, and the budget of each bidder. Furthermore, some bidders may also know the initial
bid sequences and bid-permuting algorithms of others, but not the final bid sequences.
The assumption M3 addresses the extreme case about informational security where electron-
ically transmitted information about bids may be legitimately or illegitimately revealed against
the wishes of their bidders. To enforce this assumption, the model can be implemented in an
Internet auction as follows. Before the auction starts, each bidder submits her initial bid sequence
and bid-permuting algorithm to the trusted auctioneer. After the auction stops accepting any
new bid, the auctioneer will execute the bid-permuting algorithm publicly. In such an imple-
mentation, while a bidder’s initial bid sequence and bid-permuting algorithm may be leaked to
others, her final bid sequence is not known to anyone including herself and the auctioneer, until
the auction commences.
Kao et al. [14] also considered an assumption M3’ alternative to M3. Under M3’, each bidder
may submit any bidding algorithm which generates a final bid sequence without necessarily
specifying an initial bid sequence. Therefore, less information may be revealed under M3’ than
under M3; in other words, M3’ is a weaker security assumption. Moreover, it is not even clear
that under M3’, a bidder’s optimal probability distribution of all possible bids can be computed
in finite time. For these two reasons, this paper does not use M3’.
Under the above model, Kao et al. [14] gave optimal bidding algorithms for the case where
(1) all bidders have equal budget, (2) every bid must have a positive dollar amount, and (3) the
number of bidders is two or is an integral divisor of the number of objects. In this paper, we
resolve only the case of two bidders where the adversary bidder A knows the disadvantaged bidder
D’s initial bid sequence and bid-permuting algorithm, but not vice versa. We give a new optimal
bidding algorithm for D which improves upon the previous results with two generalizations: (1)
the bidders may have unequal budgets, and (2) bids with zero dollar amounts are allowed. These
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two seemingly minor relaxations make the design and analysis of the new algorithm considerably
more difficult than those of the previous algorithms [14]. For one thing, one might naturally
anticipate that the optimal expected numbers of objects won by A and D would be proportional
to their budgets. Surprisingly, this is not true (Corollary 3.8). Our new algorithm runs in optimal
O(n) time in a straightforward manner. The case with more than two bidders is open.
To outline the organization of the rest of the paper, we give some technical definitions first.
The bid set of a bidder refers to the multiset formed by the bids in her initial bid sequence. For
convenience, we refer to an initial sequence and its corresponding bid set interchangeably. Let
BA (respectively, BD) be the bid set of A (respectively, D). Let πA (respectively, πD) be the
bid-permuting algorithm of A (respectively, D). A may know πD and BD, while D does not
know πA and BA. We assume that A is oblivious in the sense that A does not know in advance
the outcome of permuting BD with πD. Note that bidding against a non-oblivious adversary is
trivial.
Let w(πA, πD, BA, BD) be the expected number of objects that A wins. Since an auction in
our model is a zero-sum game over the objects, the expected number of objects that D wins is
exactly n− w(πA, πD, BA, BD). Let w
∗(πD, BD) be the maximum of w(πA, πD, BA, BD) over all
πA and BA. We give a bidding algorithm (π
∗
D, B
∗
D) which is optimal for D, i.e.,
w∗(π∗D, B
∗
D) = min
πD,BD
w∗(πD, BD). (1)
Note that the game has an infinite pure strategy space, so it is not immediately clear that
von Neumann’s min-max theorem is applicable [3–5].
It has been shown [14] that without loss of generality, (1) D always uses the uniform bid-
permuting algorithm πunif which permutes a sequence x1, . . . , xn with equal probability for every
permutation of the indices 1, . . . , n and (2) thus, A uses the identity bid-permuting algorithm
πid which leaves a sequence unchanged (see Fact 1). Therefore, our main task is to design an
initial bid sequence for D. A sequence x1, x2, . . . , xℓ of bids is proportional if
xi
xj
= i
j
holds for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ ℓ. A bid is unbeatable if it is greater than the budget of A. In this paper, we give a
B∗D that consists of (i) a sequence of zero bids, (ii) a sequence of proportional bids, and (iii) a
sequence of unbeatable bids. The length of each sequence, which could be zero, depends on the
ratio R of the budget of A over that of D.
Section 2 details B∗D. Section 3 proves its optimality for D by showing that Equation (1)
holds. Section 4 concludes the paper with open problems.
2 The bidding algorithm of the disadvantaged bidder
This section gives an optimal bidding algorithm (π∗D, B
∗
D) for D. All sets in this paper are
multisets. Let |X| be the number of elements in X counting multiplicity. Let Xd =
⋃d
i=1X, for
each positive integer d. Let X0 = ∅. Let sum(X) =
∑
x∈X x. Let β be the budget of D. Hence,
the budget of A is βR.
We discuss the case 1
n
≤ R < n first. Let Ψ = {0}ℓ0 ∪
{
β
n−ℓ0
}n−ℓ0
, where
ℓ0 =


n R < 1
n
;⌈
n−1
n
⌉
R = 1
n
;
0 R > n.
One can easily verify that (πunif,Ψ) is an optimal bidding algorithm for D, where w
∗(πunif,Ψ)
equals min
{
1
2 ,
1
n
}
for R = 1
n
and equals n− ℓ0 for R <
1
n
or R > n.
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Hence, the rest of the paper assumes 1
n
< R ≤ n. In §2.1, we give a bid set Ψ for D. In §2.2,
we prove an upper bound on the number of objects that A can win against Ψ. In §3, we prove a
matching lower bound, thereby proving the optimality of Ψ.
2.1 An optimal bid set for the disadvantaged bidder
The next fact simplifies our analysis.
Fact 1 (See [14])
1. If BA ∩ BD = ∅, then w(πA, πunif, BA, BD) = w(πid, πunif, BA, BD) ≤ w(πunif, πD, BA, BD)
for any bid-permuting algorithms πA and πD.
2. If πD = πunif, then A has an optimal bidding algorithm with BA ∩BD = ∅.
By Fact 1, the rest of the paper may assume πD = πunif without loss of generality. Thus, let
π∗D = πunif. Moreover, as long as BA and BD are disjoint, we may assume πA = πid.
For any positive real numbers x and y, define φ (x, y) = y ·
(⌈
x
y
⌉
− 1
)
, which is the largest
integral multiple of y that is less than x. Let φ (x) = φ (x, 1). Clearly, φ (x) = 1
y
·φ (xy, y). Define
Ψ =

 {0}
ℓ1 ∪
{
β
n−ℓ1
}n−ℓ1
if 1
n
< R ≤ 2
n+1 ;{
2i
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)
· β | i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ2
}
∪ {0}n−ℓ2 if 2
n+1 < R ≤ n,
where
ℓ1 = φ
(
2n−
2
R
+ 1
)
;
ℓ2 = min
{
n,
⌊
n
R
⌋}
.
Note that 1
n
< R ≤ 2
n+1 implies 0 < n −
1
R
< ℓ1 < n. Also,
2
n+1 < R ≤ n implies 1 ≤ ℓ2 ≤ n.
Therefore, Ψ is well defined. Clearly, sum(Ψ) = β.
2.2 An upper bound on A’s winning
For each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, let
Rℓ = φ
(
R,
2
ℓ(ℓ+ 1)
)
;
f(ℓ) = n− ℓ+
ℓ(ℓ+ 1)Rℓ
2n
.
Define
equilibrium(n,R) =
{
ℓ1
n
if 1
n
< R ≤ 2
n+1 ;
f(ℓ2) if
2
n+1 < R ≤ n.
The next lemma provides an upper bound for w∗(πunif,Ψ).
Lemma 2.1 w∗(πunif,Ψ) ≤ equilibrium(n,R).
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Proof.
Case 1: 1
n
< R ≤ 2
n+1 . By ℓ1 > n −
1
R
, we know β
n−ℓ1
> βR. Since Ψ contains n − ℓ1
unbeatable bids, the lemma is proved.
Case 2: 2
n+1 < R ≤ n. Let Ψ
′ consist of the nonzero bids in Ψ. It suffices to show that A
wins no more than
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)Rℓ2
2n bids in Ψ
′ on average. By Fact 1(2), A has an optimal algorithm
(πid, BA) with BA∩Ψ
′ = ∅. Clearly, for each bid x ∈ BA, if i is the largest index with
2iβ
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)
< x,
then x wins i
n
bids in Ψ′ on average. Hence, the unit price for A to win a bid in Ψ′ is greater
than 2nβ
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)
. By πD = πunif and BA ∩ Ψ
′ = ∅, the expected number of bids in Ψ′ that BA wins
is an integral multiple of 1
n
. Since the budget of A is βR, the expected number of bids in Ψ′ that
A wins is at most φ
(
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)βR
2nβ ,
1
n
)
= 1
n
·φ
(
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)R
2
)
= ℓ2(ℓ2+1)2n ·φ
(
R, 2
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)
)
=
ℓ2(ℓ2+1)Rℓ2
2n .
3 The optimality of the bid set Ψ
The main result of this section is Theorem 3.7, which shows the optimality of Ψ by proving
w∗(πunif,Ψ) = min
πD,BD
w∗(πD, BD). (2)
Suppose BD = {β1, β2, . . . , βn}, where β1 ≤ β2 ≤ · · · ≤ βn. Without loss of generality, we may
assume sum(BD) = β. Let Bℓ =
⋃ℓ
i=1 {βn−ℓ+i} and tℓ = sum(Bℓ) for each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. For
technical reason, define β0 = 0.
3.1 Technical lemmas
For each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, an ℓ-set is a multiset over {0, 1, . . . , ℓ}. For any ℓ-set I, let bsum(I, ℓ) =∑
i∈I βn−ℓ+i. An ℓ-set I satisfies Property P if the following conditions hold:
P1. |I| ≤ n.
P2. sum(I) ≥ Rℓℓ(ℓ+1)2 .
P3. bsum(I, ℓ) + (n − |I|)βn−ℓ < βR.
For any positive real number q, an ℓ-set I is an (ℓ, q)-set if sum(I) ≥ qℓ(ℓ+1)2 and bsum(I, ℓ) ≤ qtℓ.
Clearly, the union of an (ℓ, q1)-set and an (ℓ, q2)-set is an (ℓ, q1 + q2)-set.
Lemma 3.1 If there is an ℓ-set set that satisfies Property P, then w∗(πunif, BD) ≥ f(ℓ).
Proof. Let I be the ℓ-set that satisfies Property P. By Property P1, the n-element set X =
{βn−ℓ}
n−|I| ∪ {βn−ℓ+i | i ∈ I} is well defined. By Property P3, sum(X) = bsum(I, ℓ) + (n −
|I|)βn−ℓ < βR. Therefore, there exists a positive number δ such that BA =
⋃
x∈X {x+ δ}
satisfies sum(BA) ≤ βR and BA ∩ BD = ∅. Since each bid in BA is greater than βn−ℓ, A wins
all n− ℓ bids in BD −Bℓ. By Property P2, the expected number of bids in Bℓ that A wins with
BA is at least
sum(I)
n
≥ Rℓℓ(ℓ+1)2n . Thus, w
∗(πunif, BD) ≥ n− ℓ+
Rℓℓ(ℓ+1)
2n = f(ℓ).
Roughly speaking, an (ℓ, q)-set specifies a good bid set for A that spends the budget effectively.
For example, if I is an (n,Rn)-set with |I| ≤ n, then, by β0 = 0 and Rn < R, one can easily
verify that I satisfies Property P. The next lemma is crucial in designing cost-effective bid sets.
Lemma 3.2 For each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, the following statements hold.
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1. For each integer d ≥ 0, there is an
(
ℓ, 2d
ℓ
)
-set I1(ℓ, d) with |I1(ℓ, d)| = 2d.
2. For each integer h with 0 ≤ h ≤ ℓ+12 , there is an
(
ℓ, 1− 2h
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
-set I2(ℓ, h) with ℓ − 1 ≤
|I2(ℓ, h)| ≤ ℓ.
3. For each integer k ≥ 1 and each h = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ, there is an
(
ℓ, k + 2h
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
-set I3(ℓ, k, h)
with kℓ+
⌊
2h
ℓ+1
⌋
≤ |I3(ℓ, k, h)| ≤ kℓ+
⌈
2h
ℓ+1
⌉
.
4. For each integer d ≥ 1 and each h = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ, there is an
(
ℓ, 2d
ℓ
+ 2h
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
-set I4(ℓ, d, h)
with |I4(ℓ, d, h)| ≤ 2d+ 2.
5. If ℓ ≤ n − 1, then for each integer d ≥ 0, there is an ℓ-set I5(ℓ, d) with |I5(ℓ, d)| = 2d,
sum(I5(ℓ, d)) ≥ ℓd, and bsum(I5(ℓ, d), ℓ) ≤
2dtℓ+1
ℓ+1 .
Proof. Let L = {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}. For each i = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ, let xi = βn−ℓ+i. Define y(i) =
2itℓ
ℓ(ℓ+1) , for
any integer i. Let i0 = argmaxi∈L xi− y(i). Clearly, xi− xi0 ≤ y(i− i0) holds for each i ∈ L. By∑
i∈L xi − y(i) = 0, we know xi0 ≥ y(i0). Let
i1 = argmin
i∈L
xi + xℓ−i+1;
i2 = argmax
i∈L
xi + xℓ−i+1;
i3 = arg max
i∈L−{ℓ}
xi + xℓ−i.
Statement 1. Clearly, the inequality xi1 + xℓ−i1+1 ≤ xj + xℓ−j+1 holds for each j ∈ L. By
averaging this inequality over all ℓ values of j, we have xi1 + xℓ+1−i1 ≤
2tℓ
ℓ
. One can easily verify
that the statement holds with I1(ℓ, d) = {i1, ℓ− i1 + 1}
d.
Statement 2. If h = 0 (respectively, h = ℓ+12 ), then one can easily verify that the statement
holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L (respectively, I2(ℓ, h) = I1
(
ℓ, ℓ−12
)
). If i0 = h, then xh ≥ y(h), and thus
the statement holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L− {h}. If i0 > h, then i0 − h ∈ L, and thus the statement
holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L∪ {i0 − h}− {i0}. It remains to prove the statement for the case 1 ≤ i0 <
h < ℓ+12 . Clearly, i0 6∈ {ℓ− h, ℓ+ 1− h} and {ℓ− h, ℓ+ 1− h, i0 − 2h+ ℓ, i0 − 2h+ ℓ+ 1} ⊆ L.
If xℓ−h ≥ y(ℓ − h), then the statement holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L ∪ {i0 − 2h+ ℓ} − {i0, ℓ− h}.
If xℓ+1−h ≥ y(ℓ + 1 − h), then the statement holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L ∪ {i0 − 2h+ ℓ+ 1} −
{i0, ℓ+ 1− h}. Now we assume xℓ−h < y(ℓ − h) and xℓ+1−h < y(ℓ + 1 − h). If ℓ is even, then
clearly i2 6= ℓ+1− i2. One can verify that the statement holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L∪ {ℓ+ 1− h}−
{i2, ℓ+ 1− i2}. If ℓ is odd, then clearly i3 6= ℓ− i3. If xi3 + xℓ−i3 ≥ xℓ, then let J = {i3, ℓ− i3};
otherwise, let J = {ℓ}. Clearly, bsum(J, ℓ) ≥ 2tℓ
ℓ+1 and sum(J) = ℓ. One can verify that the
statement holds with I2(ℓ, h) = L ∪ {ℓ− h} − J .
Statement 3. If h = 0, then the statement holds with I3(ℓ, k, h) = L
k. If ℓ+12 ≤ h ≤ ℓ,
then the statement holds with I3(ℓ, k, h) = L
k−1 ∪ I2(ℓ, ℓ − h). If xh ≤ y(h), then the statement
holds with I3(ℓ, k, h) = L
k ∪ {h}. It remains to consider the case that both 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ2 and
xh > y(h) hold. If i0 + 2h− ℓ− 1 ∈ L and i0 6= h, then, by xh > y(h), the statement holds with
I3(ℓ, k, h) = L
k∪I1(ℓ, 1)∪{i0 + 2h− ℓ− 1}−{i0, h}. When either i0+2h−ℓ−1 6∈ L or i0 = h holds,
we show i0+h ∈ L, which implies that the statement holds with I3(ℓ, k, h) = L
k∪{i0 + h}−{i0}.
If i0 = h, then i0+ h ∈ L holds trivially. If i0 6= h, then, by 2h ≤ ℓ, we know i0+2h− ℓ− 1 < i0.
By i0 ∈ L and i0 + 2h− ℓ− 1 6∈ L, we have i0 + 2h ≤ ℓ+ 1, and thus i0 + h ∈ L.
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Statement 4. If there is an i4 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , h} such that xi4 + xh−i4 ≤ y(h), then the state-
ment holds with I4(ℓ, d, h) = I1(ℓ, d) ∪ {i4, h− i4}. If there is an i5 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ− h} such
that xh+i5 + xℓ+1−i5 ≤ y(ℓ + 1 + h), then, by d ≥ 1, the statement holds with I4(ℓ, d, h) =
I1(ℓ, d − 1) ∪ {h+ i5, ℓ+ 1− i5}. If no such i4 or i5 exists, then we have 2tℓ =
∑
0≤i≤h(xi +
xh−i) +
∑
1≤i≤ℓ−h(xh+i + xℓ+1−i) > (h+ 1)y(h) + (ℓ− h)y(ℓ+ h+ 1) = 2tℓ, a contradiction.
Statement 5. By ℓ + 1 ≤ n and Statement 1, there is an
(
ℓ+ 1, 2d
ℓ+1
)
-set I1(ℓ + 1, d) with
|I1(ℓ+1, d)| = 2d. We show that the statement holds with I5(ℓ, d) = {j − 1 | j ∈ I1(ℓ+ 1, d)}. By
the proof for Statement 1, I1(ℓ+1, d) is an (ℓ+1)-set not containing 0. Thus I5(ℓ, d) is an ℓ-set.
Clearly, |I5(ℓ, d)| = |I1(ℓ+1, d)| = 2d, sum(I5(ℓ, d)) = sum(I1(ℓ+ 1, d))−2d ≥ (ℓ+2)d−2d = ℓd,
and bsum(I5(ℓ, d), ℓ) = bsum(I1(ℓ+ 1, d), ℓ + 1) ≤
2dtℓ+1
ℓ+1 .
For each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, let δℓ = (R−Rℓ)
ℓ(ℓ+1)
2 . Clearly,
R = Rℓ +
2δℓ
ℓ(ℓ+ 1)
. (3)
By Rℓ = φ
(
R, 2
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
, we know 0 < δℓ ≤ 1. Let kℓ = ⌊Rℓ⌋, dℓ =
⌊
(Rℓ − kℓ)
ℓ
2
⌋
, d′ℓ =⌊
(Rℓ − kℓ)
ℓ+1
2
⌋
, hℓ =
(
Rℓ − kℓ −
2dℓ
ℓ
)
ℓ(ℓ+1)
2 , and h
′
ℓ =
(
Rℓ − kℓ −
2d′
ℓ
ℓ
)
ℓ(ℓ+1)
2 . Since Rℓ is an
integral multiple of 2
ℓ(ℓ+1) , we know that kℓ, dℓ, d
′
ℓ, hℓ, and h
′
ℓ are integers with kℓ = ⌊Rℓ⌋,
0 ≤ dℓ <
ℓ
2 , 0 ≤ d
′
ℓ <
ℓ+1
2 , 0 ≤ hℓ < ℓ+ 1, 0 ≤ h
′
ℓ < ℓ, and
Rℓ = kℓ +
2dℓ
ℓ
+
2hℓ
ℓ(ℓ+ 1)
(4)
= kℓ +
2d′ℓ
ℓ+ 1
+
2h′ℓ
ℓ(ℓ+ 1)
. (5)
One can easily verify that either d′ℓ = dℓ or d
′
ℓ = dℓ + 1 holds. Moreover, if d
′
ℓ = dℓ, then
h′ℓ = dℓ + hℓ. If d
′
ℓ = dℓ + 1, then h
′
ℓ = dℓ + hℓ − ℓ <
ℓ
2 .
Lemma 3.3 For each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, we have
1. kℓ+1 = kℓ and
2. dℓ+1 = d
′
ℓ.
Proof.
Statement 1. Assume for a contradiction that ki < kj holds for some 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n.
By kj ≤ Rj < R, we know ki ≤ kj − 1 ≤ ⌈R⌉ − 2. It suffices to show ⌈R⌉ − ki ≤ 1 as
follows. If i is even, then, by di <
i
2 , we know di ≤
i−2
2 . By Equations (3) and (4), δi ≤ 1,
and hi < i + 1, we have ⌈R⌉ − ki =
⌈
2di
i
+ 2(hi+δi)
i(i+1)
⌉
≤
⌈
i−2
i
+ 2(i+1)
i(i+1)
⌉
= 1. If i is odd, then,
by d′i <
i+1
2 , we know d
′
i ≤
i−1
2 . By Equations (3) and (5), δi ≤ 1, and h
′
i < i, we have
⌈R⌉ − ki =
⌈
2d′
i
i+1 +
2(h′
i
+δi)
i(i+1)
⌉
≤
⌈
i−1
i+1 +
2i
i(i+1)
⌉
= 1.
Statement 2. By Equations (3), (4), and (5) and Statement 1, we have
2dℓ+1
ℓ+1 +
2hℓ+1+δℓ+1
(ℓ+1)(ℓ+2) =
2d′
ℓ
ℓ+1 +
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ(ℓ+1) . Therefore, dℓ+1 +
hℓ+1+δℓ+1
ℓ+2 = d
′
ℓ +
h′
ℓ
+δℓ
ℓ
. By h′ℓ < ℓ, hℓ+1 < ℓ + 2, and 0 <
δℓ, δℓ+1 ≤ 1, we have |dℓ+1 − d
′
ℓ| < 1, and thus dℓ+1 = d
′
ℓ.
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3.2 Matching lower bounds on A’s winning
Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 analyze the cases (1) 1
n
< R ≤ 2
n+1 , (2)
2
n+1 < R ≤ 1, and (3) 1 < R ≤ n,
respectively. By Lemma 3.3(1), the rest of the section omits the subscript of kℓ.
Lemma 3.4 If 1
n
< R ≤ 2
n+1 , then w
∗(πunif, BD) ≥
ℓ1
n
.
Proof. Let ℓ be the number of bids in BD that are less than βR. If ℓ ≥ ℓ1, then the expected
number of bids that A wins with BA = {0}
n−1 ∪ {βR} is at least ℓ
n
, ensuring w∗(πunif, BD) ≥
ℓ1
n
. The rest of the proof assumes ℓ < ℓ1. By (n − ℓ)βR ≤
∑n
j=ℓ+1 βj , we have
∑ℓ
j=1 βj ≤
βR
(
ℓ− n+ 1
R
)
. By (n − ℓ)βR ≤ β, we have ℓ ≥ n − 1
R
. By ℓ1 < 2n −
2
R
+ 1, we know
2ℓ + 1 > ℓ1, which implies 2ℓ ≥ ℓ1. Let i
∗ = argmin0≤i≤2ℓ−ℓ1 βℓ−i + βℓ1−ℓ+i. Let X = {0}
n−2 ∪
{βℓ−i∗ , βℓ1−ℓ+i∗}. Clearly, sum(X) ≤
2
∑ℓ
j=ℓ1−ℓ
βj
2ℓ−ℓ1+1
<
∑ℓ
j=1
βj
ℓ−n+R−1 ≤ βR. Let BA =
⋃
x∈X {x+ δ},
where δ is a number such that 0 < δ ≤ βR−sum(X)
n
and BA ∩ BD = ∅. Since sum(BA) ≤ βR,
|BA| = n, and the expected number of bids that A wins with BA is at least
ℓ1
n
, the lemma is
proved.
Lemma 3.5 If 2
n+1 < R ≤ 1, then w
∗(πunif, BD) ≥ f(ℓ2).
Proof. By 2
n+1 < R ≤ 1, we know ℓ2 = n ≥ 2 and f(ℓ2) =
(n+1)Rn
2 . By Lemma 3.1 and
β0 = 0, it suffices to show an (n,Rn)-set with at most n elements. If Rn =
2
n+1 , then, by n ≥ 2,
{i∗, n− i∗} is a required (n,Rn)-set, where i
∗ = argmin1≤i≤n βi + βn−i. The rest of the proof
assumes Rn >
2
n+1 . Since Rn is an integral multiple of
2
n(n+1) , we know Rn ≥
2
n
. By Rn < R ≤ 1
and Equation (4), we know Rn =
2dn
n
+ 2hn
n(n+1) , where dn ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ hn ≤ n. By Lemma 3.2(4),
we know that I4(n, dn, hn) is an (n,Rn)-set with |I4(n, dn, hn)| ≤ 2dn + 2. It remains to consider
the case 2dn + 2 > n. By dn <
n
2 , we have dn =
n−1
2 , and thus Rn =
n−1
n
+ 2hn
n(n+1) . By Rn < 1,
we know hn <
n+1
2 . It follows that Rn = 1 −
2h
n(n+1) , where 0 < h =
n+1
2 − hn ≤
n+1
2 . By
Lemma 3.2(2), I2(n, h) is an (n,Rn)-set with |I2(n, h)| ≤ n.
Lemma 3.6 If 1 < R ≤ n, then w∗(πunif, BD) ≥ f(ℓ2).
Proof. For notational brevity, the proof omits the subscript of ℓ2. By 1 < R ≤ n, we know
ℓ =
⌊
n
R
⌋
, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1, k ≥ 1, and Rℓ ≤ n < R(ℓ+ 1). We first show f(ℓ) ≤ f(ℓ+ 1) as follows.
Let ∆ = f(ℓ) − f(ℓ + 1). Clearly, ∆ = 1 + 1
n
(⌈
Rℓ(ℓ+1)
2
⌉
−
⌈
R(ℓ+1)(ℓ+2)
2
⌉)
, and thus ∆ is an
integral multiple of 1
n
. Therefore, it suffices to show ∆ < 1 + R2n (ℓ(ℓ+ 1)− (ℓ+ 1)(ℓ+ 2)) +
1
n
=
1− R(ℓ+1)
n
+ 1
n
< 1
n
.
By f(ℓ) ≤ f(ℓ+ 1) and Lemma 3.1, it suffices to show an ℓ-set or an (ℓ+ 1)-set that satisfies
Property P for each of the following cases.
Case 1: Rℓ ≤ n ≤ ⌊ℓRℓ⌋+k. Let I = I1(ℓ, dℓ)∪I3(ℓ, k, hℓ). By Equation (4) and Lemmas 3.2(1)
and 3.2(3), we know that I is an (ℓ,Rℓ)-set with ⌊ℓRℓ⌋ ≤ |I| ≤ ⌈ℓRℓ⌉ ≤ ⌈Rℓ⌉ ≤ n, proving
Property P1. Being an (ℓ,Rℓ)-set, I satisfies Property P2 and bsum(I, ℓ) ≤ Rℓtℓ. By |I| ≥
⌊ℓRℓ⌋ ≥ n−k, k ≤ Rℓ < R, and βn−ℓ+tℓ ≤ β, we know (n−|I|)βn−ℓ+bsum(I, ℓ) ≤ kβn−ℓ+Rℓtℓ <
R(tℓ + βn−ℓ) ≤ βR. Therefore, I satisfies Property P3.
Case 2: ⌊ℓRℓ⌋ + k + 1 ≤ n ≤ k(ℓ + 1) + 2d
′
ℓ +
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
. Let I = I5(ℓ, d
′
ℓ) ∪ I3(ℓ, k, h
′
ℓ).
By Equation (5), k ≥ 1, and 2d′ℓ < ℓ + 1, we have ⌊ℓRℓ⌋ + k = kℓ +
⌊
2d′
ℓ
ℓ+2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
+ k ≥
8
kℓ +
⌊
2d′
ℓ
ℓ+2h′
ℓ
+ℓ+1
ℓ+1
⌋
≥ kℓ + 2d′ℓ +
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
. By Lemmas 3.2(3) and 3.2(5), we have n − k ≤
kℓ + 2d′ℓ +
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
≤ |I| ≤ kℓ+ 2d′ℓ +
⌈
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌉
≤ ⌊ℓRℓ⌋+ k + 1 ≤ n, proving Property P1. By Lem-
mas 3.2(3) and 3.2(5) and Equation (5), we have sum(I) ≥ ℓd′ℓ +
(
k +
2h′
ℓ
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
ℓ(ℓ+1)
2 =
ℓ(ℓ+1)
2 Rℓ,
proving Property P2. By |I| ≥ n − k, βn−ℓ + tℓ = tℓ+1 ≤ β, and Equation (5), we know
(n−|I|)βn−ℓ+bsum(I, ℓ) ≤ kβn−ℓ+
2d′
ℓ
ℓ+1tℓ+1+
(
k +
2h′
ℓ
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
tℓ ≤ Rℓβ < βR, proving Property P3.
Case 3: k(ℓ+1)+2d′ℓ+
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
+1 ≤ n < R(ℓ+1). By n < R(ℓ+1), we have n ≤ ⌈R(ℓ+ 1)⌉−1.
By ℓ + 1 ≤ n and Equations (3) and (5), we have ⌈R(ℓ+ 1)⌉ = k(ℓ + 1) + 2d′ℓ +
⌈
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ
⌉
. By
k(ℓ+ 1) + 2d′ℓ +
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
+ 1 ≤ n ≤ ⌈R(ℓ+ 1)⌉ − 1, we have
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
+ 2 ≤
⌈
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ
⌉
. It follows from
h′ℓ + δℓ ≤ ℓ and h
′
ℓ ≥ 0 that
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
= 0 and
⌈
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ
⌉
= 2. By k(ℓ + 1) + 2d′ℓ +
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
+ 1 ≤
n ≤ k(ℓ + 1) + 2d′ℓ +
⌈
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ+1
⌉
− 1, we know n = k(ℓ + 1) + 2d′ℓ + 1. By Lemma 3.3(2) and
Equations (3), (4), and (5), we have
⌈
2(hℓ+1+δℓ+1)
ℓ+2
⌉
= R(ℓ+ 1)− (k(ℓ+ 1) + 2dℓ+1) = R(ℓ+ 1)−
(k(ℓ+ 1) + 2d′ℓ) =
⌈
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ
⌉
= 2. Therefore 1 <
2(hℓ+1+δℓ+1)
ℓ+2 ≤ 2. By 0 < δℓ+1 ≤ 1 and ℓ ≥ 1,
we have 0 <
2hℓ+1
ℓ+2 < 2, and thus
⌊
2hℓ+1
ℓ+2
⌋
≤ 1 ≤
⌈
2hℓ+1
ℓ+2
⌉
. It follows from n = k(ℓ + 1) + 2d′ℓ + 1,
Equation (4), and Lemma 3.3(2) that ⌊Rℓ+1(ℓ+ 1)⌋ ≤ n ≤ ⌈Rℓ+1(ℓ+ 1)⌉. We prove the statement
for the following two sub-cases.
Case 3(a): n = ⌈Rℓ+1(ℓ+ 1)⌉. Let I = I1(ℓ + 1, dℓ+1) ∪ I3(ℓ + 1, k, hℓ+1). By Equation (4),
Lemmas 3.2(1) and 3.2(3), we know that I is an (ℓ + 1, Rℓ+1)-set with ⌊(ℓ+ 1)Rℓ+1⌋ ≤ |I| ≤
⌈(ℓ+ 1)Rℓ+1⌉ = n, satisfying Property P1. Being an (ℓ + 1, Rℓ+1)-set, I satisfies Property P2
and bsum(I, ℓ+ 1) ≤ Rℓ+1tℓ+1. By |I| ≥ ⌊(ℓ+ 1)Rℓ+1⌋ ≥ n − 1 ≥ n − k, k ≤ Rℓ+1 < R,
and βn−ℓ−1 + tℓ+1 ≤ β, we know bsum(I, ℓ+ 1) + (n − |I|)βn−ℓ−1 ≤ Rℓ+1tℓ+1 + kβn−ℓ−1 <
R(tℓ+1 + βn−ℓ−1) ≤ βR, satisfying Property P3.
Case 3(b): n = ⌊Rℓ+1(ℓ+ 1)⌋. Let J1 = I3(ℓ, k, 0) ∪ I5(ℓ, d
′
ℓ) ∪ {h
′
ℓ}. Let J2 = I3(ℓ, k, 0) ∪
I5(ℓ, d
′
ℓ + 1) − {h
′
ℓ}. By the proof of Lemma 3.2(3), we know h
′
ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} ⊆ I3(ℓ, k, 0).
Therefore, |J1| = |J2| = kℓ+2d
′
ℓ+1 = n− k. By
⌊
2h′
ℓ
ℓ+1
⌋
= 0, we know ℓ−h′ℓ ≥ h
′
ℓ. By ℓ−h
′
ℓ ≥ h
′
ℓ
and Lemmas 3.2(1) and 3.2(3), one can verify that each of J1 and J2 satisfies Properties P1 and P2.
It remains to show that either J1 or J2 satisfies Property P3 as follows. If βn−ℓ+h′
ℓ
<
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)β
ℓ(ℓ+1) ,
then, by tℓ+1 = βn−ℓ+ tℓ ≤ β and Equations (3) and (5), we know bsum(J1, ℓ)+ (n−|J1|)βn−ℓ <
2d′
ℓ
ℓ+1tℓ+1+ktℓ+
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)β
ℓ(ℓ+1) +kβn−ℓ ≤ βR. Thus J1 satisfies Property P3. Now we assume βn−ℓ+h′ℓ ≥
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)β
ℓ(ℓ+1) . By
⌈
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ
⌉
= 2, we know h′ℓ + δℓ >
ℓ
2 , and thus ℓ − (h
′
ℓ + δℓ) < h
′
ℓ + δℓ. It
follows from tℓ ≤ tℓ+1 ≤ β and Equations (3) and (5) that bsum(J2, ℓ) + (n − |J2|)βn−ℓ <
ktℓ+
2(d′
ℓ
+1)tℓ+1
ℓ+1 −
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)β
ℓ(ℓ+1) +kβn−ℓ ≤
(
k +
2d′
ℓ
ℓ+1 +
2(h′
ℓ
+δℓ)
ℓ(ℓ+1)
)
β = βR. Thus J2 satisfies Property P3.
Theorem 3.7 (πunif,Ψ) is an optimal bidding algorithm for D. Furthermore, w
∗(πunif,Ψ) =
equilibrium(n,R).
Proof. Clearly, w∗(πunif,Ψ) ≥ minπD,BD w
∗(πD, BD) holds trivially. By Lemmas 2.1, 3.4, 3.5,
and 3.6, we know that w∗(πunif,Ψ) ≤ equilibrium(n,R) ≤ w
∗(πunif, BD) holds for any bid set BD
of D. Therefore, we have Equation (2), and thus the equality w∗(πunif,Ψ) = equilibrium(n,R).
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By Theorem 3.7, the optimal expected winning of A (respectively, D) is equilibrium(n,R)
(respectively, n− equilibrium(n,R)). We define A’s effective winning ratio EA(n,R) to be
equilibrium(n,R)
nR
R+1
.
Similarly, D’s effective winning ratio ED(n,R) is
n− equilibrium(n,R)
n
R+1
.
Note that R
R+1 (respectively,
1
R+1 ) is the fraction of A’s (respectively, D
′s) budget in the
total budget of A and D. One might intuitively expect that A (respectively, D) would win nR
R+1
(respectively, n
R+1) objects optimally on average. In other words, EA(n,R) = ED(n,R) = 1.
Surprisingly, these equalities are not true, as shown in the next corollary.
Figures 1 and 2 show ED(n,R) in 3D plots. Figure 3 shows ED(n,R) for some values of R in
2D plots.
Corollary 3.8
1. If R ≥ 1, then limn→∞EA(n,R) =
(2R−1)(R+1)
2R2 and limn→∞ED(n,R) =
R+1
2R .
2. If R ≤ 1, then limn→∞EA(n,R) =
R+1
2 and limn→∞ED(n,R) =
(2−R)(R+1)
2 .
Proof. Straightforward.
Remark. The formulas in Corollary 3.8 are symmetric in the sense that those in Statement 1
can be obtained from Statement 2 by replacing R with 1
R
.
4 Open problems
This paper solves the case with two bidders. The case with more than two bidders remains open.
Another research direction is auction with collusion. Note that our model is equivalent to auction
with colluding groups where the bidders all have equal budgets, and those in the same group pool
their money. For example, if the budgets of two money-pooling bidders are $100 and $100, then
either of them can make a bid of $150. If pooling is not allowed, then neither can make a bid of
$150. It would be of interest to optimally or approximately achieve game-theoretic equilibria for
auctions with non-pooling collusion.
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